Competing institutional trajectories in organization. by Morales, Jérémy & Pezet, Anne
COMPETING INSTITUTIONAL TRAJECTORIES IN 
ORGANIZATION 





Université Paris Dauphine – DRM Crefige 
Place du Mal de Lattre de Tassigny 






Université Paris Dauphine – DRM Crefige 
Place du Mal de Lattre de Tassigny 





Our paper is based on an ethnographic approach. One of the authors has conducted an ethnographic study at 
TechCo, a multinational aeronautic company, during 4 months. Following the actors, actants and allies at 
TechCo, we will show that two institutional trajectories compete for controlling the organization. Financial and 
technical rationales confront each other in order to control TechCo. Those two rationales or institutional 
trajectories are supported by discourses, inscriptions or managerial devices. By examining those discourses, 
inscriptions and devices, we will try to enlighten control in action through two competing institutional 
trajectories – financial and technical. This approach, which we qualify as “controlizing”, is necessary to observe 
practices in the field. Latour (2002) thus observed the manufacture of law. We have observed here the 
manufacture of control. Controlizing is characterised by the search for a highly hybrid content more than by the 
study of actors alone, containers (the tools), processes or outcomes. 
INTRODUCTION 
“In fluid situations some actors will try to put together alternative institutional projects to 
organize the field. The goal of the analyst must be to identify the main possible projects and 
who their proponents are. (…) By tracing how the proponents of these possible institutional 
orders framed their projects, modified them to make them more attractive to others, and 
basically built political band wagons around them, the analyst can attempt to see how groups 
of institutional entrepreneurs produce new orders” (Fligstein, 2001, p.122). This is what we 
try to do here.  
Our paper is based on an ethnographic approach. One of the authors conducted a 4-month-
long ethnographic study at TechCo, a multinational aeronautic company. Following the 
actors, actants and allies at TechCo, we will show that two competing institutional trajectories 
compete to control the organization. Financial and technical rationales confront each other 
over control in TechCo. These two rationales, or institutional trajectories, are supported by 
discourses, inscriptions, and managerial devices. By examining those discourses, inscriptions 
and devices, we will attempt to bring to light control in action, or controlizing, through two 
competing institutional trajectories – financial and technical.    
Instead of studying the unavoidable conquest of the financial rationale over the whole 
organizational and corporate field (Gleadle & Cornelius, 2005; Ezzamel & Burns, 2005; Dent, 
1991), we suggest in this paper to analyze an institutional competition between a technical 
logic and its financial counterpart. The struggle has not yet led to a final and definitive victory 
of one side over the other, but this does not mean that it will continue this way indefinitely. It 
means that we don’t know what and when the end will be. It is this very process of 
competition between two institutional logics that is our focus here and not the final outcome.  
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techniques as well. Discourses are crucial in the process of institutionalization (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1986). However power is of great significance if we are to study reproduction and 
change within organizational context (Capps, Hopper, Mouritsen, Cooper & Lowe, 1989; 
Fligstein, 2001). Eventually, managerial technologies (ERP, budgets, etc.) reveal the state of 
competing forces since they are “boundary objects”, “devices that are able to mediate 
different actor-worlds” (Briers & Chua, 2001). The institutional competition that is at work in 
the case study suggests that discourses, powers and managerial techniques are closely tied.  
Actor Network Theory (ANT) will be of great interest here as it makes possible the scrutiny 
of networks of actants and the hybridization phenomenon. The hybridization of ideals and 
discourses, powers and managerial devices suggests a new interpretation of control, more 
intricate and based on the scrutiny of more actors (financial but also operational managers) 
and more actants (inscriptions, managerial devices, etc.). We suggest a new exploration of 
controlizing instead of control, of control as it occurs instead of control as it is (Latour, 2002).  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Firstly, our conceptual framework is 
based on several shortcomings of neo-institutional theories (Fligstein, 2001; Hasselbladh & 
Kallinikos, 2000). It entails a new insight into the study of the institutionalisation process and 
competition between two rationales. Secondly, we will expose our research methods. The call 
for the immersion of scholars in concrete organizational situations (Dent, 1990; Covaleski & 
Dirsmith, 1990) will be met by an ethnographic methodology. Thirdly, the case, TechCo, will 
be described and subsequently analysed. Finally, a discussion and a conclusion will be drawn. 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
For two decades now, neo-institutional theories have constituted a basic and fruitful 
framework for many research works in accounting as well as in other academic areas (Scott, 
1995). As opposed to rational choice theories, neo-institutional theories highlight the 
explanatory power of institutions in the understanding of our societies (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1991). Whatever their form – cultural, coercive or mimetic –, institutions immerse individuals 
into values, beliefs, norms or rules. Yet, despite its ability to explain society as a collection of 
fields driven by this institutional repertoire, new institutionalism misses two key points. By 
adopting a macro or meso perspective, these theories do not address, particularly in their 
empirical agenda, two critical issues. 
Firstly, new institutional theories do not pay enough attention to individual skills and powers. 
Individuals are considered as submissive recipients of values, beliefs, norms or rules 
(Fligstein, 2001). They are made institutional “dopes” without any personal or collective 
interest (Giddens, 1984). By bringing in Giddens’ and Bourdieu’s works, Fligstein (2001) 
draws attention to individual skills and powers: “Actors, under both stable and unstable 
institutional conditions, are not just captured by shared meaning in their fields, understood 
either as scripts as they might be interpreted by professionals or government bureaucrats. 
Instead, they operate with a certain amount of social skill to reproduce or contest systems of 
power and privilege. They do so as active members of a field whose lives are wrapped up and 
dependent on fields” (p.111).  
Secondly, new institutional theories do not directly address the very process of 
institutionalisation (Hasselbladh & Kallinikos, 2000; Barley & Tolbert, 1997). How are 
institutions concretely embodied in our societies or organizations? How do new institutions 
emerge? These questions remain for the most part unanswered. New institutionalism’s 
empirical agenda has overlooked this critical issue. We suggest in this paper that 
institutionalisation processes lean on material vehicles that embody institutional values, 
beliefs, norms or rules (Hasselbladh & Kallinikos, 2000). It is thanks to these material 
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corporate fields, managerial technologies characterize the largest share of this fundamental 
materiality. By establishing routines backed by managerial technologies, individuals and 
groups build new behaviours in order to institutionalise their own social ideals. Putting the 
focus on the interactions between institutions, individual skills and powers and managerial 
devices has an important consequence: it entails new insights into organizational change. 
Most research on organizational change and accounting rely on a winner–loser logic. 
Struggles for power and control characterize institutionalisation processes (Oliver, 1991). It is 
acknowledged that two rationales may exist but, in order to maintain its identity, the 
organization will tend towards a unique set of values (Townley, 2002). Usually, a financial 
rationale is opposed to technical or commercial rationales (Gleadle & Cornelius, 2005; 
Ezzamel & Burns, 2005; Dent, 1991). And typically, “the winner is:” the financial rationale. 
We argue here that, before the triumph of one party over another, or rather, instead of a clear 
victory of one of the competing logics, the organization is the scene of a struggle between 
rationales. This struggle has no predictable ending and, more likely, seems to oppose two 
legitimacies and two different local social orders in which rival individuals and groups 
activate resources, powers, and knowledge in order to strengthen their side. In order to 
achieve this observation, we will highlight, on the one hand, individuals, resources, powers, 
and knowledge and, on the other, managerial technologies as boundary objects between the 
two logics. 
Firstly, we focus on individuals and their ability to activate resources in order to reinforce 
their own legitimacy. Individuals are not overwhelmed by institutions and supra powers. 
Similarly to Fligstein (2001), we suggest that actors develop social skill: “the production and 
reproduction of current sets of rules and distributions of resources depend on the skilled 
performance of actors who use their social power and knowledgeability to act for themselves 
and against others” (pp 111). Individuals in organization possess the ability to “engage others 
in collective action” in order to construct or reproduce local social orders. 
Secondly, managerial technologies are underlined as material vehicles through which social 
ideals are embodied. Both technical and financial managers use managerial devices such as 
capital budgeting procedures, budget or information systems. These technologies are located 
at the heart of the institutional struggle between them. Indeed, they are the very objects that 
enclose the balance of powers. At this point, the work of Foucault will be our main reference 
as it considers the combination of power and knowledge and avoids the deadlock of 
subjugation as regard to subjectification. Individuals or groups are not entirely dominated; 
they are able to activate resources on their own (Pezet E., 2006), in particular through 
managerial technologies.  
Following this theoretical path, renewed analysis of the (re)production of local social orders 
requires a robust framework that rejects the easiness of “cutting reality into slices”. On the 
contrary, we will try to investigate our case study by combining what pertains to discourses, 
power or techniques as well. Actor Network Theory (ANT) will be of great interest here as it 
makes possible the scrutiny of networks of actants and the hybridization phenomenon. The 
institutional struggle that is at work in the case study suggests that discourses, powers and 
managerial techniques are closely tied. Discourses about historical technical excellence 
compete with socially legitimate discourses about financial discipline. Powers are rendered 
visible by inscriptions (high-status buildings or not, photographs in corridors and offices, 
etc.). Finally, managerial technologies reveal the state of competing forces since they are 
“boundary objects” (Briers & Chua, 2001). Miller (1998) shows that accounting margins are 
of great interest. The connections and struggles between the financial world and the technical 
world will be the focus of our examining, through an ethnographic case study. 
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This research question cannot be understood from a de-contextualised standpoint. If the goal 
is to better understand the viewpoints expressed by different actors, being fully immersed in 
daily routines and concrete work situations is a necessity (Dent, 1990; Covaleski and 
Dirsmith, 1990). This is why an ethnographic approach was adopted (Van Maanen, 1979 ; 
Sanday, 1979). Notably, it is based on the enquirer being present in the workplace of those 
under observation for a prolonged period of time. The main method associated with 
ethnography is the direct observation of practices. In the event, it was participant observation, 
and therefore understanding through practising, which was employed (see Becker, 1958).  
After carrying out several interviews with members of the holding company and another 
division of the same group, one of the authors was recruited by the vice Chief Financial 
Officer (vice-CFO) of TechCo. For a period of four months, his official mission was to help 
in the implementation of fully integrated Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) software
1. In 
particular, the observer was to focus on “purchasing flows” and on the company’s “reporting 
flows”. With respect to the first, the goal was in fact to translate into the form of “workflows” 
the set of tasks performed in the Purchasing Management, but also to ensure that all 
information regarding the suppliers would be input correctly into the new programme. For the 
reporting flow, the goal was to prepare specifications for the tailoring of reports, enabling 
management controllers to continue to produce the “reporting book” on a regular basis.  
This project therefore gave him the opportunity to meet all the members of the Financial 
Management (within which his office was located), several members of the Information 
Systems Management (all those working on the project), as well as numerous operational 
managers (notably members of the Purchasing Management). The position of the observer, 
integrated into the Financial Department but distanced from issues of career and influence by 
his status, enabled him to build close ties with the management controllers. However, the 
standards of the new information system did not perfectly map onto the organisation in place: 
it was therefore necessary to choose, for each task, between modifying the organisation and 
making specific IT developments. As a result, the observer had an opportunity to see 
operational managers “deconstruct” and “rationalise” their own ways of working. 
Furthermore, his position as a “young graduate” with little experience and much to learn 
allowed him to ask a certain number of questions, and to force his interlocutors to explain 
explicitly practices which they consider self explanatory. Finally, the participant observer 
status enables someone to focus attention on the range of non-human elements that play a role 
in the organisation (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987; 1991): for instance, the premises (layout of 
buildings and offices), documents (in-house newspapers, spreadsheets provided or received 
by management controllers, digitised data files), or IT interfaces (which impose a particular 
configuration how information is processed and how it is displayed) may influence the form 
that the controlizing of the organisation will take.  
Using an ethnographic approach enables us to see contradictory rationales and divergent 
viewpoints appear (Ahrens and Dent, 1998). Although the discourses of controllers sketch a 
certain vision of the organisation, it is not necessarily congruent with the vision given by 
operational managers. Hence, the goal is to bring out this divergence and bring to light the 
similarities and differences between the two points of view, in a way that could be described 
as “archaeological” (Foucault, 1969). All definitions of the situation are therefore considered 
as valid as that given by the financial managers.  
                                                 
1 In fact, the project, supervised by the vice-CFO and the Chief Information Officer (CIO), consists in 
harmonising the information systems of all the subsidiaries in the division and to set up the accounting module 
of the software used in production. 
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management controllers. The approach was therefore mainly inductive (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967). The posture adopted thus bore the mark of interpretive sociology: it was a matter of 
understanding the meaning that actors give to their actions (Weber, 1971), and building a 
subjective definition of the work done by actors in their daily interactions (Hughes, 1996; 
Goffman, 1961; Becker, 1963). This position justifies the choice of taking a qualitative 
approach aimed at “in-depth” understanding of practices, and observing control practices in 
situ (Ferreira and Merchant, 1992; Tomkins and Groves, 1983). Within the bounds of reason, 
the observer tried to tie what he saw with what his interlocutors said (Van Maanen, 1979), and 
compare (and occasionally even confront) the discourses of various people to strengthen the 
credibility of each piece of information.  
The data gathered consist of a systematic description of the premises, situations and practices 
being observed, and a transcription of formal discussions (during meetings) and informal 
conversations (in the corridors, in front of the coffee machine, during lunchtime) that the 
observer was a party to. With this purpose, a field journal was kept and updated daily. For 
instance, during each meeting, the room (its size, furniture, decor, any office equipment), the 
people (those present, their dress code, positions around the table, those invited but absent), 
and the discourses (order of speaking, contents of discourse, the tone of voice adopted, not 
forgetting jokes and small talk) were systematically described (which posed no problem, 
given that generally everyone took notes and the observer was in fact in charge of writing up 
the minutes). Likewise, after each meal, the observer noted down comments about the people 
present at his table and what he had remembered of the discussions. After the observation 
period, telephone conversions and several revisits to the field of research enabled the observer 
to obtain complementary data.  
CASE STUDY  
TechCo is a French industrial firm in the aeronautic sector, medium-sized (a little under one 
thousand staff) and a subsidiary of a diversified international group (more than ten thousand 
employees, with sales of 1.8 billion euros in 2005). Its structure is divided into three 
divisions, each corresponding to a type of products (Division X manufactures fuel circulation 
systems; Y specialises in oxygen masks; and Z produces components for aircraft control 
panels). The divisions are themselves divided into three departments: production (sometimes 
including a purchasing management and a logistics management), industrialisation (design 
office and works methods), and design (Research and Development). Two divisions are 
located in the Greater Paris area, on the same site as the Headquarters, and the third (Division 
X) is based in South-east France. Observation was conducted within the Financial 
Management in the Paris region.  
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The structure, built around the technical functions, already reveals what participant 
observation will show in more detail. It is the “Design Office”, i.e. the research activities, 
which is the pride and joy of the company. Indeed, the firm sells high-technology products in 
limited series production runs: research is therefore considered critical to the company’s 
future. It is also a way of displaying the particularly high-level expertise of the engineers and 
technicians concerned: leaving production to move into design is seen as a move up in status. 
Both division directors followed the same career path: They moved from positions as 
directors of production towards responsibilities as directors of design before being promoted 
as directors of their respective divisions. It is the technical trades calling upon the 
competencies of engineers, which are most highly valued in the company.  
However, there are some at TechCo who do not enjoy this situation. Indeed, celebrating the 
technical expertise of the company has amounted to pushing financial considerations into 
second place. The CFO, the vice-CFO, and the management controllers therefore consider 
that finance should have a more important position in operational decision-making. The CFO 
supervises the director of accounting (who manages a team of twelve, including a chief 
accountant), the management control manager (who manages a team of three management 
controllers and two management assistants), and the vice-CFO. Each management controller 
is attached to a division: they are therefore close to operational managers and take part in the 
board meetings of their divisions (every two months). This closeness reminds them on a daily 
basis of the symbolic devaluation of finance in the company, yet still allows them to see, from 
a financial definition of the business, what may pass as mistakes or weaknesses by operational 
managers. They then refute a situation that they see as inadequate: They resent their work 
being perceived as interfering in the work of operational managers.  
During an informal conversation, for instance, one of the management controllers complained 
about the lack of financial follow-up in projects:  
(Paul, management controller at Z. Company canteen): For the A380, we had to make two 
calculators. But the costs went sky-high… so now they are selling at a loss! Well, 
commercially, we had to be in on it… but still! (…) The division directors don’t do enough 
financial plans, and the studies are not at all accessible to the finance. They hide them and 
keep everything for themselves. So there are no figures before negotiations. [In my former 
company], there were always financial simulations, and a sales rep could not sell a project 
until it had been validated by a financial officer. Here, it’s really not like that… 
Management controllers (and more generally, representatives of the Financial Management) 
feel constrained by operational managers in their own work. They come to perceive a certain 
number of problems, but they cannot react because they are sidelined from the decision-
making process. In particular, their position within the organisation does not allow them to 
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the operational viewpoint if it is to get through.  
Having experienced different situations in their former companies, controllers have difficulty 
accepting this weakened position. They describe themselves as simple observers, not able to 
actively participate in decision-making: They see everything, but can say nothing. Their 
influence passes instead through the management tools that they bring to life on a daily basis 
(monthly reporting, budgetary procedure), or one-off tools (often Excel spreadsheets) that 
they create on demand from the division directors. However, their tools are no more accepted 
than their participation in decision-making, as the case analysis that follows will show.  
ANALYSIS 
The description of the case shows that two rationales, technical and financial, oppose each 
other without the financial rationale ever imposing itself definitively. We will now show those 
concrete manifestations in which these two rationales confront each other and end up living 
with each other without one ever getting ahead of the other. Discourses, powers and 
management devices will all enable each side to mark its territory.  
Ideals and discourses: tradition vs. emergent 
Technical ideals at TechCo are deeply embedded in its history and culture. The company 
maintains its historical core by narratives and stories that circulate among employees, thus 
becoming mythical. Its website includes a significant historical section that celebrates the 
glorious past of TechCo.  
“In 1879, a Frenchman made a maiden balloon flight that changed the course of his life 
forever. His name was Maurice M., and in 1896 he founded the company that later became 
TechCo. M. struck up a friendship with one of the century's great balloonists, J Paul. 
Together, they set up a ballooning society named the Union Aeronautique de France.” 
“Keen to establish his firm's presence in all areas of the conquest of the skies, M. changed its 
name in 1909 to Societe Francaise de Ballons Dirigeables et d'Aviation TechCo, 
incorporating the trade name into the company name for the first time. The workshops, in 
turn, were taken over and renamed TechCo. The year 1911 marked the end of a transition. 
The enterprise was no longer a craft venture producing to order. It was now an industrial 
company manufacturing in large runs and bidding for procurement contracts.” 
TechCo website consulted on December 8, 2005 (extracts). 
Thus, the original source of TechCo culture lies in technical expertise and excellence and 
moreover, in the enthusiastic spirit of its founders. Technical superiority is therefore 
intimately associated with eagerness and fervour, very positive values. In addition, 
photographs celebrate this magnificent past.  
Exhibit 1 – The magnificent history 
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website, they don’t belong to the rich story of the company. Indeed, in the “Strategy” section, 
financial ideals appear as an insignificant issue vis-à-vis the actual key factors of success: 
high technology, R&D, manufacturing processes and methods. 
“The TechCo strategy is powerfully oriented toward world growth in high-tech sectors to 
satisfy a demanding customer base; growth in expanding, high-margin markets to secure our 
long-term future; growth in niches where TechCo can hold leadership positions; steady 
growth in earnings per share to ensure shareholder satisfaction and loyalty.” 
“Mastering the most advanced technologies: One of the keys to TechCo's success is its 
continuous presence on the leading edge of innovation and technology. This enables us to 
offer products that are efficient, safe, and compliant with the strictest standards and 
certification requirements. Our efficiency-embodied in numerous patents-is the result of R&D 
programs focusing on factory performance and manufacturing processes. The programs cover 
such areas as CAD, CAPM, robotics, and optimization of structural design.” 
TechCo website consulted on December 8, 2005 (extracts). 
The unobtrusiveness of financial discourses, in comparison with the current average on most 
corporate websites, shows that the technical rationale is local and ingrained in history and 
myths, whereas the financial rationale lies on cosmopolitan actors (Briers & Chua, 2001) and 
outer discourses. While technical managers’ careers stretch out within TechCo just after they 
graduate, new financial managers have been recruited outside the company in order to renew 
the financial team (see below). It seems that the technical culture is “genetic”, whereas the 
financial rationale is cosmopolitan. 
This situation leads us to say that the “dominant corporate culture” is an engineering culture, 
close to that observed by Dent (1991) in a railroad company: “Prior to the study, the dominant 
culture within this management group was well established, and centred on engineering and 
production concerns. Accounting was incidental in this culture: it was necessary in the 
technical-rational sense of ensuring that revenues were accounted for and suppliers were paid, 
but it was not incorporated into the culture among the senior management elite in any 
significant way. Rituals, symbols and language celebrated the primacy of the engineering and 
production orientation” (p.707). Within this culture, engineers are judged as more competent 
to assess work and therefore create management tools. They only call on controllers to 
understand accounting data, whenever they must justify themselves to senior management. 
Controllers must not interfere in projects: it is the operational managers who design them and 
sell them to clients, with the financial relevance remaining a secondary consideration.  
Within the “financial subculture” (Dent, 1991), reality is perceived differently. For the 
financial officers, the current state of mind was valid when TechCo was a very profitable 
small-sized firm, but the environment has changed. They state three main arguments to justify 
their participation in decision-making: the holding expects results in financial terms; clients 
want to cut costs; the risks of failures are high (notably for projects). The behaviour of 
managers is consequently perceived as a resistance to control. But it is not a matter of 
resistance to the institution (Ezzamel, Willmott & Worthington, 2004; Oliver, 1991; Prasad & 
Prasad, 2000; Thomas & Davies, 2005), because, on the contrary, the operational managers 
represent the existing institution. Nor is it a matter of resistance to change, because the 
division directors are also looking to improve the company’s results. The two populations 
invoke the same outcome, but take very different paths: two competing institutional 
trajectories can therefore be seen. As a result, there is a struggle for control, which mobilises 
different forms of powers. 
Powers: inscriptions, social skill and allies  
The two rationales establish their respective powers not only through symbolic or material 
inscriptions but also by mobilising social skill and allies. At TechCo, inscriptions take a 
variety of forms: types and positioning of buildings, photographs, reception rituals, 
recruitment, etc.  
  8One of the most visible inscription modes resides in the allocation of buildings. The main site 
actually contains two addresses, each having a distinct parking lot and reception area. The 
first address is composed of several one-storey buildings and it houses the senior 
management, human resources, general services, the production and research workshops of 
the two divisions, quality management, as well as the works council and the company 
canteen. The second, more recent, address is a two-storey building that houses the sales 
management, financial management, and information systems management. It is possible to 
move from one address to the other without leaving the building by taking an underground 
passageway. This second building was built as a response to a problem of space, but being 
transferred from the old building to the new was seen more as a demotion than as providing 
more space for the services concerned. A symbolic separation can therefore be observed 
between the main, more prestigious, activities and the support activities that are isolated, 
distanced, and hidden away.  
Likewise, rituals and symbols bear witness to the pride of belonging to a cutting-edge 
industry. Air shows or induction days for new employees become an opportunity to show and 
explain the products designed by TechCo. Also heralding this sense of pride are large posters 
displayed in numerous rooms, or mechanical parts exhibited in showcases. TechCo’s 
technical culture is so embedded that certain members of the financial management did not 
hesitate to mobilise it when they celebrated the first steps of the A380, a giant airliner 
designed by Airbus in which TechCo is participating, or by perpetuating the “myth” of the 
company’s founder, who would land his helicopter in front of his office (which he flew 
himself).  
 
Exhibit 2 – Technical Inscriptions
   
But the financial officers also deploy their own inscriptions. The CFO, who declares himself 
far more interested in problems of acquisitions and mergers than in operational management, 
explicitly hopes to introduce a more financial culture into the company. After graduating with 
an MBA from the University of Columbia, he worked in the M&A department of a large 
French industrial group. Management controllers are also “defectors”. Before joining TechCo, 
one of the management controllers worked in an auditing firm owned by one of the Big Four. 
The other two were headhunted by the CFO from a company reputed for the efficiency of its 
management control system (Lambert, 2005). Showcasing externally acquired competencies 
in the divisions and departments reputed for their professionalism and their technical know-
how acts as a symbolic inscription for the financial officers.  
However, these inscriptions are not legitimate within the technical culture. Financial officers 
consequently find themselves in the position of “challenger group”, and must mobilise their 
“social skill” to legitimise their power (Fligstein, 2001). The vice-CFO, who may be 
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operational managers. When he identifies a problem, he starts by looking for all the possible 
solutions before signalling the problem, so as to position himself as an expert in the matter. 
He then organises a meeting, but before it takes place, he meets the key people informally to 
win them over to his side. Finally, during the meetings, he blends technical arguments that are 
easily understood by operational managers with “accounting jargon”, thus avoiding 
contradictory points of view.  
Naturally, these tactics are not always effective. In the negotiation that then ensues, seeking 
allies becomes particularly important (Latour, 1987). Outsiders are precious allies in these 
cases, since they do not recognise the dominant culture of TechCo. Thus, the vice-CFO often 
reminds people that he does not impose changes for the sake of his own pleasure, but because 
he has been asked to do so. In this way he gains entry into the discussion for his network: 
when he wants to justify one alternative in relation to another, his phrases regularly start with, 
“Yesterday, when I was in the office [of the group’s CFO], he told me that he saw it more like 
this…” Consequently, it is no longer he, but a member of the holding, who is making the 
decision. He is no longer the spokesman for the financial management, but spokesman for a 
larger, more coercive and more legitimate network (according to a rational-legal legitimacy in 
the sense of Max Weber, 1971). 
Members of the holding are important allies. As shareholder representatives, they can claim 
property ties as their source of power (Fligstein, 1987). In addition, the holding is not 
influenced by the same culture as TechCo, the group’s cash cow. On the contrary, the holding 
is listed on the markets and has seen strong external growth. The group’s chairman puts great 
store in modern principles of financial management to be able to provide relevant information 
to financial analysts. The group’s CFO is therefore a powerful ally for TechCo’s financial 
officers.  
Inscriptions, the mobilising of social skill and the search for allies consequently enable the 
financial officers to propose an alternative institutional trajectory to that proposed by the 
engineers. As a result, they enter into a struggle for control with the goal of establishing their 
power in the organisation. It must be noted however, as Fligstein (2001) points out, that the 
search for power cannot be a declared goal. On the contrary, the motivation displayed by 
financial officers is not to increase their power, but to instil sounder management and a long-
run vision. Consequently, they avoid criticism from operational managers, who would never 
accept financial officers acting in their own interests.  
The institutionalisation trajectories stem from two sources of power. Traditional sources 
notably appear in the ideals and discourses, and are therefore symbolic; they have been 
institutionalised in the past, and so appear in the corporate structure, which makes them the 
hierarchical source of power. Emergent sources, in contrast, require allies in order to impose 
themselves. They rely on managerial techniques and boundary objects: they enable 
inscriptions to be created that interest operational managers. A new actor appears who will 
have to negotiate with the actor in place, but who will not necessarily replace him. This 
triggers a struggle for power, which, in the daily routine, translates into a struggle for control. 
These two struggles are perhaps two stages of the process of institutionalisation. Whilst ever 
the process is incomplete, we find ourselves in an intermediary situation, a negotiated order 
(Strauss, 1992). This negotiated order is also based on management devices.  
Management devices: war and peace 
Engineers and financers confront one another across two competing institutional trajectories. 
To be institutionalised, their ideals and power sources must be objectified (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1986), meaning transformed into material vehicles (Hasselbladh & Kallinikos, 
2000). One of the crucial contact points between the two trajectories lies in the existence of 
boundary objects. In a sort of border zone, engineers and financers alike have to take over to 
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with the same voice about improving the management in the company, it is their choice of 
management devices that will be a point of contention.  
Management devices are indeed used by financial officers as both weapons and tools of 
negotiation and pacification. They become offensive, with a relative degree of effectiveness, 
whenever financial officers seek to import traditional financial methods into TechCo. On the 
other hand, management devices cause appeasement whenever, in fine, they are accepted by 
both sides. Management devices uncover controversies but, whether after explicit or non-
explicit negotiation, they sometimes point the way towards a peace that, although precarious, 
makes “living with each other” possible. It is the boundary objects that symbolise this 
rapprochement. 
Boundary objects are numerous. The monthly routine of reporting hinges on a book (often 
only called “the P&L”) constructed by financial officers but defended by engineers. The two 
populations cooperate and reporting contributes to pacifying relations. It may also occur in 
more delicate situations, for purchasing or investment requests for example. For purchasing 
raw materials, financial officers are totally excluded from the validation process. Moreover, 
although management controllers are integrated into the process of requesting investment, 
they resent its under-instrumentation: devices that they got to know elsewhere and that may 
appear relatively standard, do not work at TechCo. Management controllers receive 
investment requests from operational managers; but they receive these requests at the same 
time as the directors, without being able to validate them ex ante:  
(Paul, management controller of Z. In his office) He shows me how the system for 
approving investment requests works. He opens one of his emails and shows me the whole 
chain of command. Someone makes an investment request; he sends out an email with 
attachments. There is one message and several names with boxes to tick. Some are ticked, 
others not. I notice, amongst others, the name of the Chairman, the CEO, division directors 
and the CFO. There must also be Paul’s name somewhere since he received it. The 
attachments are Word or Excel documents that explain the investment. There isn’t really 
any format and according to Paul, “some put in the minimum”. For example, there is 
another message from the CEO asking for details, then an answer. The CEO insists: given 
the investment, an IRR must be calculated. Paul explains to me that here, they look at the 
IRR, whereas in his former company they focused more on payback… (…) 
He shows me some spreadsheets. Some calculations have been done. He complains that 
this message has been sent to everyone at the same time. So the CEO can give his 
agreement before Paul can make any calculations. In his former company, in contrast, it 
was first sent to him, and once he had validated the calculations, it was forwarded to the 
decision-makers.  
As a result, he shows me a file that comes from his former company. It’s an Excel 
document containing fifteen spreadsheets. The first is a provisional income statement over 
four years with payback marked right at the top. The other pages present spreadsheets 
justifying the calculations and hypotheses. It is very detailed. He explains to me that, for a 
very large investment, it could take him up to six months before validating.  
Here, on the other hand, when he calls the person who sent the investment request, the 
person is always very surprised. Apparently, his initiative is frowned upon. (…) 
 
Formal meeting. No operational managers are present.  
Bernard (controller of another company in the same division): For the investments, we 
have to put in place budgetary control. Someone makes a request: if he has the budget it 
goes through, otherwise it’s blocked. For the time being, anybody can spent 100,000 
dollars without our seeing anything!  
Patrice (CFO) contradicts Bernard, but Jean-Michel (accounting director of this same 
subsidiary) agrees with him.  
Bernard: It’s purely for our information! And that goes for the purchasing requests too.  
Jean-Michel: There’s no algorithm or calculation to do, its just document management. 
Management control has follow-up, but it comes a posteriori!  
Eric (management controller from Y) agrees with him.  
  11Claire (management assistant): I print off a statement every Monday that I send to the 
budget managers…  
Fabrice (vice-CFO): But it is sent out very discretely! So there’s no coercion involved. In 
the interests of keeping things running, people aren’t blocked…  
Description of the purchasing procedure. When a purchase is made, the financial 
management has no right to oversight or approval: it is the director of purchasing who 
validates. Likewise, when a delivery is performed, the invoice and delivery note must be 
reconciled. If the amounts differ, another procedure starts. Within a certain margin 
(variance of less than five percent), the reconciliation is nonetheless performed 
automatically, as if the amount were correct. But the verification procedure may be short-
circuited: purchasing can “force through” validation, whatever the difference amounts to. 
Certain members of the financial management and the information systems management 
therefore make the following comment: “there is no longer any limit, purchasing can do 
whatever they want.” The vice-CFO even talks of a “failing in internal control”. 
But not everyone is surprised by this system: according to Claire, we must not block 
operations pointlessly.  
Standard financial devices therefore do not impose themselves when faced with the influence 
of technicians. They trigger controversy when financial officers dare to brandish them and, 
most of the time, they encounter rejection. As devices of combat, they have had until now 
little success. Financial managers cannot define the content of their jobs themselves: their 
goals, their role and therefore their identity in the organisation do not depend on them, but are 
defined by operational managers. Looking to overthrow this situation, they attempt to be 
considered legitimate within the company (Oakes, Townley & Cooper, 1998).  
Competition between financial and technical managers hinges on another type of device. 
Every two months, divisional board meetings bring the two sides together. The unity of time 
and place gives this device a particular character. Here, it is simply a matter of spotlighting 
this rivalry, so often have the more or less accepted roles of each side been rehearsed.  
(Eric and Paul, management controllers. In the company canteen). Eric tells us there is a 
meeting at 2 p.m. I ask him some questions, so that he will give me more details.  
Eric: Every two months, there is a board meeting for each division, with the top executives 
of the division, the financial director, the CEO, the sales director, etc. But twice a year, and 
it happens to be today, the Chairman is also there. And today, the meeting’s in English 
because the CEO [of an American company that has just been bought out] is present. (…) 
The heads of division must present the situation: ten minutes spent on the accounts; 
between two and three hours spent on the rest (notably, big projects in progress).  
Paul: At [my former company], it was quite the opposite.  
The observer: It must be rather interesting for you to be present at this type of meeting; it 
allows you to have a global view of the business. And what’s more, that means you are 
integrated into the boards, with the Chairman and all…  
Eric: Yes, well… sometimes I wonder if it wouldn’t be better if we weren’t at those 
meetings! (Surprised look from the observer). Well, I mean… in fact, we act to divert 
attention. When the board gets to the difficult points, they [the division directors] prefer to 
pick up on an accounting problem. Then everyone turns to us! So we explain to them 
where it comes from, what it means, etc. And that can take half an hour… In short, they 
throw everything back at us! And when that’s over, we move on to something else. In that 
way, they don’t have to explain themselves on a point that raises problems.  
As devices that set the stage, board meetings bring together technicians and financial officers 
in a single place only to confirm the supremacy of the former over the latter, at least in the 
eyes of the latter.  
This regular confrontation, transformed into a routine, reminds management controllers on a 
daily basis that they are not legitimate. In return, they refute a situation that does not appear to 
them to be adequate: instead of taking part in decision-making, they have the feeling of 
justifying decisions. As a result, their role does not seem to be to draw the attention of 
managers to particular points, but rather to divert the attention of the senior management and 
prevent it from seeing certain problems arise. The consequence of this situation is doubt cast 
on the correct translation of how the company runs into the accounts. There is therefore a loss 
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legitimately conferred on representatives of the financial management.  
A new boundary object, implemented during the observation period, will however enable the 
financial power to reverse the trend: it is the implementation of an ERP system. Indeed, by 
connecting their tools to those of operational managers, the financial officers manage to 
renew their dialogue with the latter. The financial rationale also manages to “score some 
points”. However, concessions are also necessary: rather than using the group’s ERP system, 
TechCo has bought the accounting module of the production software already in place. But 
the situation is very different: from the moment that devices are connected, any modification 
of the software has an impact on the work of the financial management, and operational 
managers can no longer change their devices without informing the financial officers. Eric, a 
management controller, perceives the interest of the new device, as much in his work as in the 
relationships that he maintains with operational managers:  
(Informal discussion, two months before the launch of the new software) 
Eric: The problem is that we cannot always link up with accounts. The result is the same… 
In fact, all the cost and sales accounts are right, but it is the management accounting that 
poses a problem. And the unexplained variance can be a million euros!  
Hence the interest [in the new software]. In [this software], variance is targeted, which 
means that, because it is a production software, there are already variance accounts into 
which all the data that we need are entered. This could allow us to have the [reporting] 
book by pushing on a single button.  
Paul: Yes, because for the time being, closure entails three and a half days of calculations 
and a day and a half of analysis.  
Eric: But it’s going to be better, since it’s going to be an ERP…  
The observer: But in fact this software seems a lot more oriented towards operations, when 
an ERP like SAP seems to be more oriented towards finance… 
Eric: Ah, that’s for sure. But [this software] was bought by the divisions ten years ago, so 
now we have to adapt. It would be too complicated to get the divisions to change…  
 
(One evening, in the company canteen. All members of the financial management and the 
information systems management are invited to celebrate the successful launch of the new 
software)  
Eric: It works rather well. There are a few difficulties right now, but in the long-run it’s 
really very good. It’s integrated… Things will be faster: there are things we do now that we 
won’t have to do anymore. And it gives us a better position with regard to operational 
managers. Before, when they used to ask where a figure for an overspend came from, it 
was difficult to explain. Now we can more easily go back and it’s in [the same software], 
so we can trace back to things that they input themselves. Afterwards, the problem comes 
either from a wrong entry, or from a real problem.  
In this new system, the controllers can go back to the source of the data, meaning an action 
performed by an operational officer. It is then no longer possible to blame the accounting 
translation. Therefore, it is by getting as close as possible to operations that the financial 
management succeeds in introducing its tools (Briers & Chua, 2001). Financial officers then 
produce devices that directly interest operational managers, whilst remaining the only ones 
able to decipher them and translate them into the language of operational managers. The 
financial management then becomes a “compulsory stopover” for operational managers 
(Latour, 1987).  
However, the discourse of managers is very different. According to them, in stark contrast, 
the financial management conducts its projects and rolls out its own tools without taking the 
problems facing these managers into account. The financial officers serve their own interests, 
or those of the senior management, but not those of ongoing operations. This criticism comes 
out, for instance, in the following discussion:  
(Company canteen. Present are the vice-CFO, the director of accounting, the chief 
accountant, the management control manager, two management controllers, the director of 
division Z and the director of design for this same division)  
  13Julien (director of division Z), in a provocative tone: So, where are we with the project [for 
adopting the production software as an accounting software]?  
The vice-CFO tells him where the situation stands.  
Julien (almost annoyed): What I see is that it is going to force me to change. But what I 
don’t understand is, what it is going to bring me? I’m not saying that my system is optimal, 
but at least it exists…  
Fabrice, calmly, puts forward several arguments. Julien answers him. 
Fabrice (less calmly): But it is not I who wants to change everything! Let me remind you 
that I was asked to do it at branch level…  
Fairly quickly, Julien losses a little of his confidence, and appears rather forlorn (he looks 
at his plate, speaks less loudly, and has stopped smiling at Fabrice’s arguments).  
Julien: What I suggest is that you come to see what I do and see how you can sort out your 
bonds afterwards.  
Fabrice: But that’s what I intended to do.  
Julien: You see, what I resent is that reporting is done for the CEO and not to help 
operational managers steer their activity.  
Véronique (management control manager): But reportings can be useful to different 
people…  
Operational managers therefore resent management tools being used to evaluate their work, 
but not being used enough to help them out. Indeed, as soon as they enter data into the 
software, variances appear and are visible to the controllers. Their reaction may therefore be 
rapid, instilling a greater atmosphere of control: individuals are constructed as objects of 
knowledge and are encouraged to self-regulate (Foucault, 1975; Robson & Cooper, 1989). We 
may notice however that the discourses are contradictory: according to management 
controllers, operational managers do not let them participate in ongoing operations; according 
to the operational managers, management controllers work mostly for the senior management 
and not enough for them.  
Consequently, due to their role as boundary objects, management devices appear as the 
central point in the tension between the two rationales, their ideals, their discourses and their 
inscriptions. Even though they do not exhaust the struggles and controversies, they open the 
debate between contradictory points of view. Their implementation, their development and 
their daily management are therefore one way of crystallising relationships, and illustrate the 
progressive construction of a negotiated order (Strauss, 1992), of shifting compromise 
between two trajectories of institutionalisation.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper’s contribution is three-fold: firstly, it points to new fields of investigation, less 
deterministic with regard to neo-institutional theories; secondly, it deepens the relations 
between humans and non-humans in the struggle for control in the organisation; finally, this 
paper represents a first attempt to open up research into control and, using the ethnographic 
method, to study controlizing. 
Because they possess a strong explanatory power, neo-institutional theories today deserve to 
be reconsidered. Too macroscopic (Hasselbladh & Kallinikos, 2000), they are also too 
deterministic (see above). In this paper, we propose to pursue and deepen work already 
undertaken to go from overly static research into institutions to research into 
institutionalisation in action, in the process of occurring. We propose introducing a non-
determined dynamic with the notion of institutional trajectory that is more flexible than is 
proposed by the process of institutionalisation. It is a matter of leaving “path dependency” 
which underpins much research. Romanticised deterministic tales in which everything ends 
happily ever after do not exhaust the subject of institutionalisation. The case of TechCo tells a 
more chaotic, undetermined story, where competing institutional trajectories develop.  
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struggle or the process of institutionalisation - and thus on changes of a radical type. With 
TechCo, it is the daily routine, invisible at first glance, which is at the centre of the analysis. 
Change occurs incrementally, undeterminably. Likewise, research on resistance, and more 
broadly neo-institutional theory, define a pre-existing environment and norms imposed on 
individuals. This research analyses how individuals resist (or adapt) to these norms. At 
TechCo, on the contrary, we observe that there exist two different rationales that often 
confront each other and sometimes move closer together.  
At TechCo, one institution does not replace another (Dent, 1991; Fligstein, 1987), but two 
rationales oppose each other. It is not the individual who fights against the institution 
(Ezzamel, Willmott & Worthington, 2004; Oliver, 1991; Prasad & Prasad, 2000; Thomas & 
Davies, 2005) nor the organisation that fights against another (for example, the institution 
which distributes resources: the State for public companies, cf. Covaleski & Dirsmith, 1988), 
but two populations that oppose each other to impose their definition of reality.  
However, we observe a shift of legitimacy, perhaps a precursor to the legitimization of 
finance and the beginning of institutionalisation. Indeed, the implementation of integrated 
software places the management controllers at the heart of ongoing operations. This boundary 
object is not an application of financial orthodoxy, but hails as an aid to decision-making and 
understanding data from the information system. The controllers’ work gains in neutrality, 
being less associated with a particular vision and with financial power. The financial vision of 
the world is thus objectified through the software, the first step towards a form of 
institutionalisation (Berger and Luckmann, 1986). At TechCo, the institutionalisation process 
of finance seems to be moving forward more rapidly that its legitimization process due to the 
boundary object that is the ERP system. However, this development is neither linear nor 
predictable: this is why we speak of trajectory rather than process. As a result, members of the 
financial management succeed in entering ongoing operations whilst still not being fully 
accepted by operational managers.  
Numerous studies have focused on implementing information technology tools. However, 
most concentrated on the methods used, the risks of failure, or “resistance to change” in the 
populations studied. Here, the approach is radically different. The development of the IT 
system and of work organisation is only a point of entry. The final goal is to better understand 
control as it happens. It is during a period of radical upheaval, when practices are thrown into 
question, that they appear most easily and actors make their postulations known.  
The second contribution of this paper is to provide insight into the relations between humans 
and non-humans and to deepen, through empirical observation, the phenomenon of 
hybridization at work. At TechCo, each competing institutional trajectory rests on ideals, 
discourses, material and symbolic inscriptions, skilled social actors, allies, and management 
techniques. The human, relational, ideal and material aspects are closely tied and mobilised to 
serve different visions of the world.  
The boundary object illustrates particularly well what a hybrid is. The device relies not only 
on individuals but also on discourses and power games, without which the device, or its 
coercive force, vanishes. Contrary to Briers and Chua (2001), we suggest here, to avoid the 
risk of reification, that it is not the ERP system that constrains operational managers, but 
rather the hybrid controllers-ERP, with all that this may include in terms of outlook on the 
world. The oversight of controllers is concentrated and magnified by the ERP system. The 
accounting eye (Hopwood, 1987) can roam freely, courtesy of hybridization. 
Finally, the third contribution of this paper is to think differently about control in 
organisations. As Anthony showed as early as 1965, responsibility for management control 
falls on managers first of all, but management controllers intervene in the process as well. 
However, these two populations do not necessarily share the same definition of control, nor 
  15the same aspirations. It is crucial to understand, empirically, how each defines the situation, to 
identify convergences and divergences in practices to better see how control is constructed in 
a daily basis. What interests us here is not control as Anthony defined it, but control as it 
occurs, or the manufacture of control. This approach, which we qualify as “controlizing”, 
justifies the ethnographic method: it is necessary to observe practices in the field, to follow 
humans and non-humans alike. Latour (2002) thus observed the manufacture of law. We have 
observed here the manufacture of control. Controlizing is characterised by the search for a 
highly hybrid content more than by the study of actors alone, containers (the tools), processes 
or outcomes.  
 



















































In conclusion, we suggest that the exploration of control as it occurs, even if it is limited to 
very local situations, can open up the search for a better understanding of what 
institutionalisation is and of how the hybridization process works. Following day-to-day 
interactions will enable us to see how decisions become routines and how ideals are integrated 
into objects.  
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